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Abstract: The increasing number of proposals to define the concept of life in biology 
has led some authors to consider this task useless and without sense. All sceptics 
base their argument on the idea that life is a natural kind with a strong metaphysical 
commitment. Considering this, the aim of this paper is to explore the concept of life 
as a non-essentialist natural kind. It is intended to highlight that complex scientific 
concepts are better understood from points of view that are not constrained by the 
rigid frameworks of essentialism and the realism/conventionalism dichotomy.
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1. Introduction
In 1976 two landers, part of the Viking program, touched down the Martian surface. One of its goals was to find indications of biological activity on the 
red planet, for which they had a series of experiments aimed at finding such 
signs. The interpretation of the results was quite complex, although at first 
they were considered negatively. Since then, the development of astrobiology 
and other new biological disciplines has been constantly increasing. As a result, 
some doubts about how to interpret the Viking experiments and other similar 
researches have emerged. To the extent that astrobiology and other new disci-
plines move within the limits of traditional biology, it is understandable that 
the interest in defining the concept of life has increased.
In this sense, Trifonov (2011) and Diéguez (2013) take as reference the 
work of Popa (2004), who collects almost one hundred different proposals of 
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the concept of life. It is also interesting to notice that one third of the propos-
als correspond to the year 2002, the last considered by Popa. Therefore, to get 
an idea of the complete picture, we must add the proposals that have emerged 
since 2002. Simply as a sample, point out the contributions of Gánti (2003), 
Ruiz-Mirazo, Peretó and Moreno (2004), Benner (2010), Damiano and Luisi 
(2010), Tsokolov (2010), Trifonov (2011), Diéguez (2008; 2013), Razeto-Bar-
ry and Ramos-Jiliberto (2013), Luisi (2015), Hermida (2016), Ferreira and 
Umerez (2018), or Smith (2018). The number of different proposals, as can be 
seen, far exceeds one hundred.
Of course, it is possible to consider this huge quantity of proposals in 
a more limited number of types of definitions. One well-known classifica-
tion was proposed by Sagan (1970), who considers physiological, metabolic, 
biochemical, genetic and thermodynamic definitions. More recently, authors 
such as Tirard, Morange and Lazcano (2010), as well as Smith (2018), have 
classified definitions of life as thermodynamic definitions, self-regulation defi-
nitions, and evolutionary ones. 
On the other hand, new approaches (e.g. hybrid theories, analysis of 
life vocabulary) try to overcome the difficulties derived from the large num-
ber of proposals. But neither analysis of life vocabulary nor hybrid proposals 
elicit a sufficient consensus. Regarding the former, there are some important 
objections to their basic thesis1. Perhaps one of the most promising ways of 
research are hybrid proposals, which consider different types of properties re-
lated through complex phenomena. Nevertheless, as Ruiz-Mirazo, Peretó and 
Moreno (2002) show, hybrid theories are still far from solving may of the 
relevant questions regarding what life is. 
Precisely, it is the large number of different proposals, and the difficulty 
to find a minimum denominator among them, which has favoured the scepti-
cism of some authors. In relation to the difficulty to find an essential property 
of the concept of life, other questions related to the concept of life remain 
unresolved: the diffuse boundary between living and non-living entities (Du-
pré and O’Malley 2009), the different assumptions of distinct disciplines 
(Ruiz Mirazo, Peretó and Moreno 2004; Machery 2012), the complexity 
of the processes involved (Popa 2004), or our limited knowledge about differ-
ent types of life (Cleland 2002). 
Of course, scepticism is not always expressed in the same way. For in-
stance, some authors conclude that life is a human kind (Keller 2002), where-
as other consider life as an individual (Mariscal and Doolittle 2018). How-
1 See the criticism by Popa (2012) or Bor Luen Tan (2012), to Trifonov (2011), among 
others.
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ever, all sceptics share a common idea, that is, to define life is to find a basic 
essential property (or a set of essential properties). But is it possible to define 
life considering a different way? In this vein, some authors as Diéguez (2008; 
2013), and more recently Ferreira and Umerez (2018), have explored some al-
ternatives based on the ideas of homeostatic kinds and relevant stability.
Bearing this in mind, the first goal is to show that criticisms to define of 
life expressed by Keller, Cleland and Chyba and other authors are valid only 
for essentialist definitions, that is, they assume that to define life is to consider 
it as essentialist natural kind (section 2). Secondly, to show that researchers, in 
their practices, do not use essentialist definitions, but operational ones (section 
3). In section 4, life will be considered as a non-essentialist natural kind, point-
ing out different ways in which this can be done. For this, different types of 
theories (Diéguez, Ferreira and Umerez, Dupré) will be considered. Finally, it 
is intended to highlight that complex scientific concepts are better understood 
from points of view that are not constrained by the rigid frameworks of es-
sentialist natural kinds and the realism/conventionalism dichotomy (Putnam, 
1988). It will also show to what extent this limitation could be overcome by 
non-essentialist proposals.
2. Objections to the possibility of defining the concept of life
As noted above, nowadays skepticism about the possibility of defining 
life is increasing. Although not all skeptics share the same argument, all share 
the criticism regarding the possibility of defining life as a natural kind in a 
strong metaphysical sense. But research is far from finding an essential property 
to define life (or some essential properties). Without these properties, the kind 
has no clear limits, so it is only possible to delimit it in a conventional sense. 
Thus, the large number of definitions about the concept of life is the 
result of a wrong metaphysic commitment. The issue has no solution, because 
life is not a natural kind, but other type of entity (an individual or a conven-
tional kind). It is possible to find these or similar ideas in Keller (2002), Tirard, 
Morange and Lazcano (2010), Machery (2012), Cleland (2002; 2011) and 
Mariscal and Doolittle (2018).
According to Keller (2002), it is possible to define life, but only in a 
conventional sense. Keller suggests that the demarcation between life and non-
life is an historical and cultural issue. In fact, before the nineteenth century, 
the opposite of living was not inorganic, but dead. Keller considers that the 
current situation with respect to definitions shows that life is not a natural 
kind, but a conventional one. Thus, it is defined by the interests and values 
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of human beings, and this also explains why there is no minimum consensus 
on necessary properties. To define life becomes an historical and social issue, 
rather than a scientific one.
Tirard, Morange and Lazcano (2010) try to move the focus of attention. 
If defining the concept of life has not yielded fruitful results, it may be more 
interesting to shift the question to how the associated characteristics of life are 
acquired. This means treating life as an empirical and historical concept. So it 
is only possible to consider the concept of life within a conceptual framework, 
rather than by a precise definition.
Machery (2010) is also critical of the possibility of defining the concept 
of life. From his point of view, life can be understood as a folk concept or 
as a scientific concept. Modern research on folk concepts does not consider 
them as definitions, so if life were a folk concept, it would not be definable. 
Therefore, to be definable it should be considered as a scientific concept. It is 
possible to do this, and in fact different disciplines use distinct definitions. The 
problem is that each discipline considers the concept of life in a different way. 
If they do not agree on what is the essential property (or properties) of life, a 
general definition cannot be found. So to define life is not possible (consider-
ing folk concepts) or it is pointless (as a scientific concept).
Cleland (2012) expresses its reluctance considering different objections. 
The first is the confusion between linguistic entities and the epistemic ones. 
Thus, definitions refer to the way that speakers use terms, that is, to define is 
a linguistic issue. But when scientists use the concept life, they are interested 
in what really life is, not how speakers use this term. From a rather exhaustive 
study of the theories of reference, Cleland assumes the position defended by 
semantic externalism. This leads her to defend that concepts as water (and life) 
are not stipulations. In addition, Cleland considers that definitions of these 
type of concepts can only make sense within a broader theoretical framework. 
Therefore, concepts such as water, only has sense in a more general molecular 
theory. Similarly, the concept of life only makes sense within a more general 
theoretical context about biology.
A second criticism considers our limitations on the knowledge of different 
types of life. If as it seems according to different theories, all current organisms 
are descended from a common ancestor (LUCA), then we only know one type 
of life. Defining a kind from only one example results, at the very least, risky. 
The situation is similar to define mammals by only knowing zebras. Although 
stripes are common to all of them, the presence of mammary glands is much 
more determinant, even if only one half of the individuals possesses them.
Finally, Mariscal and Doolittle (2018), in a recent paper, consider life in 
as an individual. This idea is not new, and some authors has considered life on 
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Earth as an individual (for instance, Hermida 2016). But according to Her-
mida, life on Earth can be understood as an instance of a more general kind, 
whereas Mariscal and Doolittle reject this idea. According to them, every type 
of life is an individual, so it would be more accurate to say that each type of life 
is Life, with capital letters. It could be possible to find some common proper-
ties in different Lifes (for instance, among life in different planets, or between 
Life on Earth and synthetic Life). But such groupings respond to the epistemic 
needs of researchers, not to any ontological priority.
As can be seen, criticisms and arguments to reject a possible definition 
are very different in distinct authors. But all of them assume that to define life 
is to consider it as an essentialist natural kind. According with this idea, natural 
kinds are associated with a(some) necessary(ies) and sufficient property(ies). The 
intense debates about whether what defines life is the capacity to evolve, to self-
regulate or both respond to the need to find such properties. There is a strong 
metaphysical commitment, so natural kinds are real and independent of human 
beings. Usually that independence is ensured through causal mechanisms.
On the other hand, according to this essentialist view, the demarcation 
of natural kinds is given by properties univocally considered, so there are no 
intermediate cases between the living and the non-living. A paradigmatic 
example of this is the definition of life as an autopoietic system given by 
Maturana and Varela (1973), especially in its first formulations. In this case, 
the systems are autopoietic or not, but it does not make sense to consider 
partially autopoietic systems. 
As a consequence, to define life in an essentialist sense is to fix the con-
cept one for all, according to some properties independent from human be-
ings. So according to this view, we need more research in order to find the 
basic essences of life. Nevertheless, as critical authors highlight, it is difficult to 
defend that life is a natural kind if it must satisfy these strict requirements. So 
their criticisms works well considering natural kinds in this strong metaphysi-
cal sense. However, this debate can be considered from a different perspective, 
that is, asking if essentialist definitions are really used by scientists, or not. It 
is also interesting to ask whether these criticisms are valid for other ways of 
understanding natural kinds.
3. Usefulness of defining the concept of life
In the previous section it has explained that criticisms about the pos-
sibility to define life work well considering definitions as essentialist natural 
kinds. But as Bich and Green (2017) show, scientists use definitions in an 
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instrumental, open and flexible way. They call these definitions “operational 
definitions”. Nevertheless, it is justified to ask what is the real way used by re-
searchers to define life. In this section, it will be explained why the benefits of 
using instrumental definitions of life in a non-essentialist way may be greater 
than their risks.
As Bich and Green show, definitions can guide research through feed-
back processes. Scientists use definitions in an instrumental sense, starting 
with provisional theoretical definitions. Those definitions are used in order 
to guide research and design experiments according to them. The results of 
these experiments are used to reconsider the original definition, and change it 
if necessary, “definitions are exploratory tools that can change over time and 
across research programs” (14). Then this feedback process starts again. Bich 
and Green show this process through Luisi’s research. 
Luisi (1998) started his research with an autopoietic conception of life. 
This first definition served as a guide for its subsequent research, in an open 
and revisable way. Based on this theoretical model, Luisi and his team de-
signed experiments that improved the understanding of different aspects of cell 
membranes, not well-known until that moment. As a result, they introduced 
changes in the theoretical model, allowing the development of new lines of 
research. For example, in 2006 and 2009 Luisi explicitly included references 
to the medium in his definition of life. On the other hand, since 2006 Luisi 
and his team seem to consider the limit of life in a non-essentialist sense, at 
least in the context of minimal cells, “clearly, the term minimal cell depicts 
large families of possibilities and not simply one particular construct” (272). 
Both modifications change significantly the original definition, and cannot be 
understood in the context of essentialist definitions.
Moreover, not defining concepts could be problematic. The research 
carried out by the Viking program show this clearly, due to the absence of a 
scientific definition of life. As Benner (2010) shows, there were experiments 
with both negative and positive results, but the final conclusion was negative. 
It seems clear that in this case the negative evidence had a greater weight. Such 
conclusion was linked to certain unspecified assumptions, namely, that life 
must be understood as life-on-Earth, at least in a metabolic sense. As those 
assumptions were not explicitly specified, researchers tried to respond to the 
conflicting results reinterpreting the positive ones. Of course, there was an-
other possibility, that is, not to reinterpret the result, but assumptions about 
life. However, this only has sense if those assumptions, that is, the definition of 
life considered, is explicitly formulated. 
This shows an important aspect. Even when explicit definitions are not 
formulated, researchers have certain beliefs about the concepts they work with. 
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Some questions arise if definitions are assumed implicitly. How to properly as-
sess a concept if it is not defined? According to what criteria? It is possible to 
change an implicit definition considering empirical research? If were possible, 
how to do this? As it happened in Viking experiments, not having explicit defi-
nitions could lead researchers to confusing, even mistaken, situations. 
Defining the concept of life is also relevant in order to delimit the fields 
of research, and thus, the possible pertinent investigations in different disci-
plines. In the research on the origin of life on Earth, it seems obvious to take 
as a starting assumption that life is based on carbon, and the presence of water 
is essential for life (on the possibility of alternative forms of life on Earth, see 
Cleland and Copley 2005). However, in other disciplines such as astrobiol-
ogy, it is not only possible, but even pertinent, to explore other options. 
To see this, it is interesting to show some theories about these alterna-
tive options. Beyond the debate on whether or not life can be based on other 
material components such as silicon, authors such as Benner, Alonso and Car-
rigan (2004) explain how ammonia could play a water-like role, “metabolism 
in liquid ammonia is easily conceivable” (170). In the same vein, sulfuric acid 
can be a suitable solvent for life processes “sulfuric acid is a reasonably good 
solvent that supports chemical reactivity” (171). Of course, other authors like 
Pace (2001) believe that life beyond Earth must be materially similar to life on 
it. On the other hand, as Lange (1996) and other authors show, in artificial life 
it is common to consider the concept of life without a specific material sup-
port. Although this idea is especially popular in artificial life, it is possible to 
find it in other disciplines, as Popa (2004) shows.
The previous examples show how different disciplines use distinct as-
sumptions regarding the concept of life. As already explained in the previ-
ous section, this has been criticized by Machery, who concludes that worrying 
about the concept of life is something pointless. However, far from it, here 
it is defended that defining the concept of life is useful both positively and 
negatively. Positively because definitions can guide scientific research in an 
open and feedback way, and according to new discoveries. Negatively, because 
as the example of the Vicking program shows, if the concepts used are not suf-
ficiently defined, research could lead to confusing results.
4. Life as a non-essentialist natural kind concept
At this point, it seems clear that it is difficult to define life as natural kind 
in a strong metaphysical sense. On the other hand, it is useful to define this 
concept. Bearing this in mind, how to reconcile both ideas? 
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The solution can be found considering other types of natural kinds. As 
other debates in biology, such as species, there are other ways of considering 
natural kinds. The first of these possibilities was explored by Diéguez (2008; 
2013), who shows that it is possible to consider life as a homeostatic natural 
kind. According to this concept, the presence of one or more properties fa-
vours the presence of other properties of the kind (due to causal mechanisms), 
but not in a necessary sense. Thus, it is not necessary for an individual to share 
all the properties of the kind.
According to Diéguez, life understood as a homeostatic property cluster 
is characterized by satisfying part of the properties of the kind favours the pres-
ence of other properties, but not necessarily. As a result, in absence of a set of 
necessary properties, the demands from a metaphysical point of view are lower 
than in the case of traditional essentialism. In second place, causal mechanisms 
ensure the realism of the proposal, that is, kinds are not a mere convention. 
Finally, boundaries of life are fuzzy, since it is not necessary for all individuals 
to satisfy all properties associated with the kind.
Diéguez’s proposal is based on the idea of homeostatic property cluster 
developed by Boyd (1999). Thus, the difficulties that Diéguez must solve are 
the same ones that Boyd must face. First, according to Khalidi (2013), some 
causal mechanisms that justify natural kinds do not tend towards equilibrium, 
so they are not homeostatic. This question is something that must be taken 
into account in complex concepts, such as life.
Ereshefsky (2010) is more critical. According to this author, Boyd pri-
oritizes the relationship of similarity when establishing homeostatic natural 
kinds. So those kinds prioritize relations of similarity to historicity (although 
it is not incompatible with it). However, Ereshefsky considers that there is a 
priority in evolutionary aspects compared to similarity relations. Therefore, 
Boyd’s theory is inadequate, at least in historical sciences, such as biology.
On the other hand, Craver (2009) expresses his objections based on the 
way in how the relevant causal mechanisms are selected. As the author shows, 
the same process can be studied through different causal mechanisms. Such 
mechanisms are not only different, but sometimes they are also incompat-
ible. According to what criteria can one prioritize versus another? In Craver’s 
opinion, the choice is given by the interests of the researchers, what it means to 
overcome the metaphysical priority implicit in Boyd’s proposal. 
Ferreira and Umerez (2018) propose some modifications on the basic 
homeostatic theory in order to solve their problems. Thus, based on the idea 
of  stability developed by Slater (2015), they modify some of the most prob-
lematic aspects, such as the role of mechanisms. To do this, they substitute 
the mechanisms for the concept of relevant stability. In any case, the problem 
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raised by Craver persists, since it is not clear how the relationship between the 
relevant stability and the epistemic role of scientific practices is articulated. 
Of course, it is possible to leave the proposal open, although this assumes the 
vagueness of the proposal.
In order to define life, another possibility is to consider promiscuous 
naturals kinds. Although this way has not explored to define life, it was used 
by Dupré (1981; 1999) and others to define species. Unlike what happens with 
homeostatic natural kinds, promiscuous kinds have no metaphysical commit-
ments, only epistemic ones. According to these commitments, it is possible to 
classify the same entities in different ways (crosscutting natural kinds). This 
allows Dupré to overcome the difficulties pointed out with respect to the ho-
meostatic kinds. And this is because in this case there are no metaphysical 
commitments articulated through causal mechanisms.
Nevertheless, this proposal should not be confused with conventional-
ism. The fact that there are multiple ways of classifying reality does not mean 
that such ways are stipulated. It is interesting to remember that Dupré is 
declared realistic, although in other promiscuous authors, such as Brigandt 
(2011) this commitment seems more diffuse. On the other hand, promiscuous 
proposals are interesting from the point of view of complex concepts such as 
life, insofar as they allow different disciplines to use different criteria, without 
having to adopt a conventional approach.
However, promiscuous proposals, even showing an interesting way to 
define the concept of life, must be able to clarify some aspects. One of the most 
confusing is the criteria that justify the realistic commitment. Although Dupré 
shows a realistic commitment, it is not clear according to which criteria is de-
clared as such. No, of course, from any metaphysical commitment, which are 
openly rejected. Without a more precise clarification of this point, this type of 
proposal may have difficulty distinguishing it from conventionalism, especially 
in those authors like Dupré who insist on realism as something characteristic 
of their proposals. Here it is interesting notice that, according to Brigandt, 
there is a gradation between natural and conventional kinds, that is, there is 
not a precise limit between them. 
5. Is life a promiscuous natural kind? 
At this point, it can be clearly seen that not only essentialist proposals, 
but also homeostatic ones, have difficulties in giving an account of the concept 
of life. On the other hand, understanding natural kinds in a promiscuous way 
offers some advantages. First, promiscuous natural kinds are compatible with 
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the diffuse limits of the concept of life. In addition, to the extent that such 
kinds depend on the interests and values  of researchers, it is not necessary to 
define every kind in exactly the same way, in different disciplines. This allows, 
for example, to classify cetaceans and fish within the same kind, according 
to hydrodynamic criteria. A final advantage, perhaps the most interesting, is 
that promiscuous natural kinds are compatible with the real scientific praxis 
(remember the cases of Luisi and the Viking program) while other proposals 
face difficulties in this regard.
It is true that some of these advantages are also found in other non-
essentialist proposals (Diéguez and Ferrreira and Umerez). But these proposals 
have difficulties to justify the objections pointed out by Khalidi, Ereshefsky 
or Craver, something that does not happen in the case of Dupré, because he 
does not consider metaphysical justifications. Complex concepts, such as life, 
do not lend themselves to justifications of this type. Instead, promiscuous pro-
posals allow focusing on scientific practices, making it possible to distinguish 
those that are successful from those that are not, according to epistemic and 
axiological criteria. However, this has repercussions on the way of understand-
ing natural kinds.
This leads to an important issue that cannot be overlooked. A good part 
of the issue comes from accepting the realism/conventionalism dichotomy. 
This is not place to analyze this problem, rooted in opposing philosophical 
traditions (Putnam 1988). However, it is important to consider that this prob-
lem underlies the debate on how to define the concept of life (and natural 
kinds in general). Indeed, authors with metaphysical commitment seek to find 
those mechanisms that ensure that kinds are not a mere conventions, as con-
ventionalists claim.
Something that follows from what has been said so far is that to consider 
the concept of life within this debate has not helped to solve the issue. That is 
why here it is proposed to leave this framework. Instead, it is intended to shift 
the focus of attention towards how researchers use complex scientific concepts, 
such as life, in line with Bich and Green’s (2017) research. However, unlike 
such authors, here it is showed that there are non-essentialist ways to under-
stand natural kinds that can be understood operationally. 
The main problem of promiscuous theories comes, precisely, from not 
accepting with all its consequences the epistemic and axiological commitments 
as opposed to the metaphysical ones. In complex scientific concepts appear a 
plurality of aspects that cannot be studied from the real / conventional sim-
plification. Instead, it is possible to use promiscuous kinds as tools capable of 
allowing the development of scientific disciplines, in an open, plural and revis-
able way. Which is precisely what scientists seem to do in their investigations.
37Defining life as a non-essentialist natural kind
Following Hacking (2007) and Brigandt (2011), it is possible to say 
that the idea of natural kinds has an undesirable metaphysical baggage per 
se. Natural membership is considered as a human-independent characteristic 
of natural kinds. This is something explicitly assumed in essentialist natural 
kinds. However, this idea underlies also homeostatic and promiscuous natural 
kinds, although more subtly. In fact, this human-independence seems to be, 
in some sense, before the insistence by Dupré on realism. That is the reason 
why Brigandt proposal is, perhaps, more interesting than other promiscuous 
ones. According to him, there is not a precise border between natural and non-
natural kinds, “I do not think that there is any clear-cut metaphysical bound-
ary between natural kinds and other kinds” (175). 
Considering this, could be interesting to define life as a promiscuous 
natural kind? The concept of life is assumed by researchers as an empirical tool, 
neither in a strong essentialist sense nor in a conventional one. So the dichot-
omy between realism and conventionalism is not useful in complex concepts, 
such as life. And is not the way used by researchers to consider the concept of 
life. Life only can be considered as a natural kind overlooking this dichotomy. 
This, if possible, only can be done in a promiscuous framework. 
As a conclusion, if were possible to consider life as a natural kind, pro-
miscuous natural kinds could be best candidate among the different types of 
natural kinds. But as can be seen, the metaphysical baggage of the concept of 
natural kind as is commonly understood contradicts the way in which natural 
kinds are considered by the most promiscuous authors. Which are, precisely, 
those that best seem to adjust when defining the concept of life as a natural 
kind. Perhaps, if were not possible to adjust the concept of natural kind to this 
weak metaphysical commitment, it could be replaced by a different term. As a 
proposal, the concept of scientific category could adopt the epistemic charac-
teristics of promiscuous natural kinds without metaphysical commitment. In 
any case, answering this question is not the target of this paper, and therefore 
this will be left open for a later discussion.
6. Conclusions
Debates on concepts such as species have developed different theories 
about natural kinds, as homeostatic or promiscuous kinds, among others. 
Nevertheless, authors who consider life as a natural kind do so from a rather 
limited perspective. They only consider life as a natural kind in an essentialist 
sense, with a strong metaphysical commitment. As noted, Diéguez and Ferreira 
and Umerez are an exception, as they open the debate to new possibilities. In 
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addition, there are other alternatives that have not been explored. Considering 
life as a natural homeostatic property cluster, and specially understanding life 
as a promiscuous kind, it is possible to overcome the difficulties pointed out 
by critics. 
Behind essentialist proposals lies a problem of greater scope, namely, the 
way to justify the realism of natural kinds. According to this the debate moves 
towards how to justify the metaphysical commitments of such kinds. How-
ever, considering life in such terms does not seem to solve the issue. This is the 
reason why some authors choose to defend that life is a conventional concept, 
or simply propose to abandon its study. Against this, it is intended to highlight 
that epistemic and axiological aspects are inseparable of complex concepts. For 
this reason it lacks sense, as is commonly assumed in natural kinds, to establish 
a line of separation between the real and the conventional aspects.
In scientific practices, researchers use concepts such as life in a much 
more open way than that proposed by metaphysical essentialism. Proposals are 
reviewable according to the empirical results, and therefore they are not mere 
conventions or stipulations. That is why taking into account the way in which 
complex concepts such as life are defined can be useful in the development of 
research. Among the possible options, promiscuous theories are characterized 
to focus on epistemic and axiological aspects against metaphysical and realistic 
commitments. 
So it is possible to define life as a promiscuous kind, and it could be 
interesting for researchers to do that. Instrumental and operational definitions 
could be useful in order to guide scientific research, providing not only theo-
retical frameworks, but also tools to design experiments and to assess them. 
But in any case the simplistic dichotomy between realism and conventionalism 
must be overcome. 
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